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The incomplete materialism of French materialist feminism 
 
According to one important and influential line of feminist interrogation of the 
category of sex, we only believe that there are two biological sexes because our 
thought and perception are constrained by the two-gender social system under which 
we currently live.i The French materialist feminists – Christine Delphy, Monique 
Wittig, Colette Guillaumin and Nicole-Claude Mathieu, amongst others – are among 
the earliest and best-known exponents of this line. In this article I will take issue with 
their position on sex, by way of an initial reconstruction of the history of the English-
speaking feminist reception of French materialist feminism. I will use this 
reconstruction to bring out two key elements of French materialist feminism: (1) its 
proposal that gender can and should be abolished; (2) its – related – denial that sex 
division is a biological reality. I will then suggest that this latter denial damages the 
claim of French materialist feminism to be materialist, and that – contrary to the 
French materialists’ claims – it is possible to affirm the biological reality of sex 
division and still pursue the abolition of gender. This is possible, I will suggest, if we 
adopt a cluster-based understanding of sex; some strengths and potential limitations of 
this cluster-based understanding will be considered in conclusion. 
 
The specificity of French materialist feminism 
Critics of the category ‘French feminist thought’ that emerged in the 1980s have 
observed that it is an eminently Anglo-American construction, in which the so-called 
‘holy trinity’ of Irigaray, Kristeva and Cixous rank as the canonical figures.ii Amongst 
those excluded from this construction are the French materialist feminists. Toril Moi 
has suggested that, ironically, ‘these [materialist] feminists have become less 
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frequently translated and less well-known [than Irigaray et al.] precisely because of 
their relative similarity [to Anglophone feminism]: they have … been perceived as 
lacking in exotic difference’.iii The French materialist feminists were perceived to be 
‘relatively similar’ in two particular ways. Firstly, like many English-speaking 
socialist feminists of the 1970s, their account of women’s subordination focused on 
the exploitation of women’s labour within the home. 
Secondly, and more relevantly here, the French materialist feminists made use 
of the concept of gender, a concept that was also central to Anglophone feminism of 
the 1970s and 1980s. The French materialists insisted that women’s subordination 
was caused by social arrangements and not biology, and, being social, could be 
removed. Thus it appeared that the French materialists adhered to the same sex/gender 
distinction that English-speaking feminists did, with both groups (apparently) holding 
that there are biological sex differences between males and females but that these do 
not cause the gender division between men and women, which is social in origin. 
Actually, though, the fact that the French materialists used the concept of 
gender obscured the fact that they understood their conception of gender to differ 
from – and to radicalise – the prevailing Anglophone conception. Delphy claims that 
most feminists who use the concept of gender accept that because there are two sexes, 
there must be two genders, which means that these feminists can only aim to redefine 
the genders non-hierarchically but not to abolish gender altogether.iv In contrast, 
Delphy maintains that the gender division is necessarily hierarchical so that feminists 
must aim to abolish gender, and hence need to show that this division is entirely 
independent of, not necessitated by, biology (otherwise, we may assume, the division 
could not be abolished any more than biology can). 
Because Delphy (and other French materialists) reconceive gender division as 
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completely independent of sex difference, they rename this reconceived division, 
largely avoiding calling it a ‘gender’ (genre) division. Nicole-Claude Mathieu 
renames gender ‘social sex’ (sexe social), while Delphy (in earlier work) renames the 
genders ‘sex-classes’ (classes de sexe).v This seems puzzling, since their talk of 
‘social sex’ and ‘sex-class’ might lead us to suppose that Mathieu and Delphy are 
discussing sex and not gender. This supposition would be mistaken. To see this, let us 
focus on Delphy’s concept of ‘sex-class’, which belongs within her broader account 
of women’s subordination as presented in Close to Home (1984). For Delphy, this 
subordination rests on men’s appropriation of women’s economic, sexual and 
reproductive labour within the home.vi This relation of exploitation divides human 
beings into two genders. One is made feminine (féminin) or masculine (masculin) – 
produced as a woman (femme) or a man (homme) – by one’s position as victim or 
beneficiary of this exploitative relation. 
If being a woman is being a victim of exploitation, how do women differ from 
other exploited groups such as proletarians? Delphy’s answer is (1) that the 
exploitative relation that produces women has a distinctive form: it (a) occurs in the 
family and (b) involves those exploited having to labour for their upkeep rather than 
for a wage; (2) that the labour that is being exploited here includes sexual and 
reproductive labour (in accordance with the traditional, unwritten marriage ‘contract’ 
whereby wives are obliged to have sex with and bear children for their husbands). So 
the economic-gender hierarchy is simultaneously a sexual hierarchy in which those 
who are exploited are sexually objectified. This is one reason why Delphy speaks of 
‘sex-classes’. A second reason why she uses this term is to indicate that what it is to 
be a woman (or a man) is to belong to a particular exploited (or exploiting) class, 
within an exploitative relation that is a social reality and not a consequence of 
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biology. Thus by renaming gender ‘sex-class’, Delphy intends to highlight how 
gender, as a fundamentally economic division, is entirely independent of sex 
(whereas, she thinks, speaking of ‘gender’ would disguise this independence, given 
the normal view that because there are two sexes there must be two genders).vii 
Other French materialists share the same underlying commitment to a concept 
of gender. Mathieu speaks of ‘social sex’ in preference to ‘gender’ for two main 
reasons: (1) to stress that this division primarily oppresses women (i.e., those who are 
‘the sex’, whose sex is marked); and (2), most importantly, to stress that the division 
into two categories (men and women) is a social division, and one that gives rise to 
the mistaken perception that these categories are grounded in nature – that is, to the 
belief in two sexes. In contrast, Mathieu claims, the usual conception of gender is that 
it is overlaid onto a pre-existing sex, so that talk of ‘gender’ carries with it uncritical 
belief in biological sex.viii Nonetheless, since Mathieu talks of ‘social sex’ so as to 
stress that the man/woman division is completely social, her ‘social sex’ is still 
actually a reconception of, not an alternative to the concept of, gender. 
The French materialists, then, sought to radicalise Anglophone conceptions of 
gender by emphasising gender’s total independence of sex. However, so far the 
French materialist standpoint still seems to resemble that of Anglophone feminism in 
that both groups appear to accept that there are two biological sexes. For instance, 
Delphy remarks that it is almost always females who are exploited in the family, and 
who are made into women through undergoing this exploitation.ix This remark seems 
to presuppose that females (and males) exist biologically. 
Elsewhere, though – more prominently in her later work, particularly the article 
‘Rethinking Sex and Gender’ (1993) – Delphy denies the biological reality of sex. 
She and other French materialists argue that we only believe that there are biological 
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sex differences, and only perceive human beings as members of two different sexes, 
because society’s gender division constrains and limits our thought.x Whenever any 
social division into two classes or categories of human beings has been instituted, we 
begin to assume that certain of people’s biological features make them into members 
of these two classes, and to perceive those features in that light. Because in this case 
the two classes are sexual subjects and objects, we find salient those of people’s 
biological features which are relevant to sex and reproduction (the internal and 
external genitals, sex hormones, etc.), and we perceive these features as dividing 
people into two biological sexes. In short, gender (or ‘sex-class’) determines sex, or to 
be precise determines our belief in and perceptions of sex, which for the French 
materialists is all that there is to sex. 
The French materialists are not denying that some people have, amongst other 
properties, breasts, vaginas, wombs, etc. while others have penises, testicles, etc. 
Rather, the French materialists are claiming that society and not nature makes these 
features salient, and that society and not nature causes us to define those with breasts 
and vaginas (etc.) as members of one sex, those with penises and testicles (etc.) as 
members of another. All this illuminates a third reason why Delphy and Mathieu use 
terms such as ‘sex-class’ and ‘social sex’: they do so because, in their view, gender-
class membership determines what sex one is perceived to be and so, effectively, what 
sex one is. (Moreover, this means that Delphy’s claim that it is almost always females 
who are exploited and thereby made into women in the domestic mode of production, 
while males almost always exploit and become men, must be qualified. She herself 
comments that it ‘remains to be proven … that women are (also) females, and that 
men are (also) males’.xi As this comment hints, Delphy should, consistently, say that 
it is almost always those who have certain bodily features - wombs, breasts, etc. - who 
 6
are exploited and are thereby made into women and into females, but who are not 
females prior to being exploited.) 
Thus, the French materialists again differed from most Anglophone gender 
feminists in that the former denied, while the latter affirmed, that sex difference is a 
biological reality. This difference went largely unnoticed in the initial English-
speaking reception of French materialists (perhaps because that reception focused 
almost exclusively on Delphy’s Close to Home, in which, as I mentioned, her 
questioning of the category of biological sex was not yet so well developed). In any 
event, during the 1990s, many Anglophone feminists themselves came to believe that 
sex is just as much of a ‘social construction’ as gender, due largely to the influence of 
Judith Butler (herself significantly influenced by Monique Wittig). By a circuitous 
route, Anglophone feminism has as it were caught up with French materialism. 
But should the French materialist feminists’ denial of biological sex be 
accepted? I will argue not, and specifically that their position that gender determines 
sex undermines their claim to be materialist. I will go on to suggest that feminists can 
accept that sex is a biological reality and follow the French materialists in pursuing 
the abolition and not merely the restructuring of gender. 
 
How to have sex without gender 
Delphy explains as follows what the French materialists take their ‘materialism’ to 
consist in. Materialism, she says, is the view that: (1) ‘the way in which life is 
materially produced and reproduced is the base of the organization of all societies’;xii 
(2) the social relations under which the production and reproduction of life takes place 
are always relations in which one class exploits the work of another;xiii (3) historical 
change results from changes in these relations of exploitation;xiv (4) and what ideas 
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and beliefs people hold depends on these exploitative social relations, which people’s 
ideas reflect.xv Evidently, then, ‘materialism’ for Delphy means ‘Marxism’, which she 
is extending so as to analyse women’s oppression as consisting at root in material 
exploitation. Thus, for Delphy, ‘materialist’ feminism holds that the material 
exploitation of women by men is primary and that ideas about men’s and women’s 
‘natures’ or proper roles, and the belief that there are two sexes corresponding to the 
two genders, are secondary consequences of this exploitation.xvi 
It may be argued that ‘materialism’ as Delphy defines it is not fully materialist. 
The Italian Marxist Sebastiano Timpanaro argues that the traditional self-
understanding of Marxism as ‘materialist’ in respect of its recognition of the primacy 
of economic life (an understanding which Delphy evidently endorses) makes 
Marxism into a theory that is not completely materialist.xvii This is, Timpanaro argues, 
because Marxism so understood takes it that humans relate to nature solely by 
working on it actively, which ignores how natural environments condition human life 
and how we human beings are conditioned by our own biological nature, a nature 
which gives us strictly limited powers and makes us insurmountably subject to ill-
health, old age and death. To be fully materialist, Marxism must acknowledge these 
facts, Timpanaro claims. Extending his claims, we might say that part of our 
biological nature as limited, finite beings is that we reproduce sexually – we are 
neither immortal nor capable of asexual reproduction – so that to be fully materialist, 
French materialist feminism would have to acknowledge this biological reality of 
sexed reproduction and, concomitantly, of the sex division. (Ironically, Timpanaro 
himself does not mention sex difference amongst the limiting aspects of human 
nature.) 
But, of course, Delphy and her co-workers would deny that sex division is a 
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biological reality. In their view, we only believe in this division because there is a 
socially instituted gender division. One of the clearest statements of the materialist 
feminist argument on this point comes from Monique Wittig. Wittig denies that any 
physical property or group of physical properties in itself makes someone male or 
female. Rather, certain physical properties – those which enable heterosexual sex and 
reproduction – are only believed to make people sexed against the background of 
particular assumptions about gender – namely, assumptions that women’s role is to 
have reproductive sex with men and bring up men’s children. These assumptions 
derive from the material relation of women’s sexual, reproductive and economic 
exploitation by men within the family. Wittig says: 
What we believe to be a … direct perception [of someone’s sex] is only a 
sophisticated and mythic construction … which reinterprets physical features 
(in themselves neutral … ) through the network of [social] relationships in 
which they are perceived.xviii 
According to Wittig, because our social arrangements produce an expectation that 
women and men should have heterosexual sex and reproduce, we come to find the 
properties that enable heterosexual sex and reproduction salient and to classify people 
in terms of just these properties; hence, we come to regard people as ‘sexed’. She 
sums up: ‘It is oppression that creates sex and not the contrary’.xix 
There are problems with Wittig’s argument. To see these problems, we first 
need to recognise two features of this argument. (1) Wittig’s argument presupposes 
that people do have certain physical properties – the genitals, sex glands, sex 
hormones, etc. – which, together, really do enable people to engage in reproductive 
sex. More precisely (most) people have either the set of physical properties which 
enables them to play the ‘male’ role in reproductive sex (that is, to be able to get 
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erections, ejaculate, etc.) or the set of physical properties which enables them to play 
the ‘female’ role (to be able to ovulate, enclose penises vaginally, etc.). (2) Part of 
Wittig’s argument is the claim that there is a social norm specifying that men and 
women should have reproductive sex. But for it to be possible for reproduction to 
become a social norm, the sets of properties that enable reproductive sex must occur 
together fairly regularly – regularly enough that this co-occurrence cannot be 
accidental but must be caused by the properties encouraging one another’s presence. 
(For instance, having XX chromosomes encourages a human embryo to form ovaries, 
which, in turn, tend to secrete relatively high quantities of oestrogen, which, in turn, 
encourages the growth of female genitals.) Unless these properties encouraged one 
another’s presence in this way, a norm prescribing reproduction could not become as 
firmly and widely established as it has. 
Now, according to one account from philosophy of biology, when certain 
biological properties tend to occur together, and when this happens non-accidentally 
(because these properties encourage one another’s presence), and when the co-
occurrence of these properties has important causal effects (in this case, enabling 
individuals to play one or the other role in reproductive sex), then those properties 
form a cluster. The initial point of this account from philosophy of biology is to 
specify that things belong to a natural kind when they have most of the properties in a 
given cluster.xx But to apply this analysis within the context of sex, individuals belong 
to either the male or female ‘kind’ - or sex - when they have enough of the properties 
in either the ‘male’ or ‘female’ clusters.xxi (On this cluster model, individuals do not 
have to have all of the properties in the relevant cluster to be male or female – for 
instance, one can be female while having had a mastectomy or  while being a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual who lacks XX chromosomes.)xxii 
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So Wittig’s claim that there is a social norm prescribing reproduction, when put 
together with her presupposition that some sets of bodily properties enable 
reproductive sex, already implies that these properties are clustered. And given that 
these properties are clustered and, specifically, form two clusters each relating to a 
different reproductive role, (most) individuals are male or female, depending on 
whether they have more of the properties in one or the other cluster. So contrary to 
what Wittig claims, her own arguments imply that most people are biologically male 
or female, regardless of what gender divisions society erects.xxiii 
Delphy would be worried by my criticisms of Wittig. She argues that if there 
really is a biological division between the two sexes, then people will inescapably be 
led to classify one another by sex and will then, in any possible society, use the sex 
division as a basis for assigning different social roles, and different types of work and 
activity, to differently sex-classified people. And in practice it is unlikely that any 
such division of labour could ever be other than hierarchical. Delphy’s worry, then, is 
that if two sexes exist then there must be two hierarchically organised social genders 
as well.xxiv 
I would suggest that this worry need not arise if we understood sex, as I have 
very briefly proposed, to be a matter of having enough of the properties in one or the 
other cluster. On this view someone can be female or male by having enough but not 
all of the properties in the relevant cluster and, in fact, while having some of the 
properties of the other sex as well. Consider again here a post-operative male-to-
female transsexual who has the XY chromosomes that form part of the ‘male’ cluster. 
This does not prevent that person from being female, as long as they have enough of 
the properties in the ‘female’ cluster and do not also have enough of the properties in 
the ‘male’ cluster to be male.xxv 
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Now, if we had this understanding of sex in the background when we classified 
one another by sex, then our classifications would not imply that all females should be 
expected to act in one set of ways that is systematically different from how all males 
should act. This implication would not follow, because our classifications would be 
based on recognition that females (and males) differ greatly from one another in terms 
of which, or how many, they have of the properties in the relevant cluster. (This 
would contrast to the current situation, in which our classifications tend to be based 
on a misplaced expectation that all females - or males - should have all of the relevant 
properties or should invariably have one single supposedly sex-defining property, 
such as XX chromosomes.) Additionally, if a cluster-based conception of sex were in 
the background, then our classifications would be based on recognition that females 
and males can be more or less similar to one another physically (because females 
often have some of the properties of males, and vice versa). In this situation, then, we 
would have no reason to expect all females to act alike and all males to act alike. We 
would therefore have no reason either to allocate all females to one position within a 
division of labour and males to another. Thus, if this cluster-based understanding of 
sex came to prevail, then sex could be, and be acknowledged to be, a biological 
reality without this having to lead, as Delphy fears it would, to an undesirably gender-
divided society. Contrary to Delphy and her co-workers, it is possible to affirm the 
biological reality of sex and to pursue the abolition of gender. 
 
Materialism of sex, idealism of nature  
At least two worries might be raised concerning the cluster-based model of sex. 
Firstly, this model might seem to imply that some individuals are more female (or 
more male) than others in virtue of having more of the properties in the relevant 
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cluster. But potentially the idea that some people are more female (or male) than 
others is in itself normative, suggesting that it is desirable to be as female (or male) as 
possible. And if so, then sex classifications would lead to a gender division –  for if a 
sharp sex dimorphism were considered desirable, then it would also be considered 
desirable to differentiate the sexes further by constraining them to act in 
systematically different ways, with those people who are less female (or male) than 
others being expected to conform to this gender-dimorphic pattern as best they can. 
However, even if the cluster model does indeed imply that some individuals are 
more female or male than others, this model does not in itself suggest that being 
highly female or male is desirable. Only against the background of a two-gender 
social system does it make sense to regard being highly female or male as desirable. 
Within this system, where all individuals are expected to conform to one of two 
opposed genders, being highly female or male appears desirable because it seems to 
enhance people’s ability to realise their assigned gender. But were we to eliminate the 
two-gender system (as I have suggested we can, in principle), the cluster model would 
cease to carry these invidious normative implications. 
In any case, the cluster model need not be interpreted as implying that some 
individuals are more female or more male than others. Instead, the model can be 
interpreted as stating that anyone who has enough properties from the relevant cluster 
crosses a threshold into belonging to that sex, where all those who cross this 
thresholdxxvi are equally as female or male as one another (irrespective of whether 
they have, say, all of the properties of their sex, most of these properties, or just some 
of them). As Natalie Stoljar says of this interpretation of cluster concepts, ‘once an 
individual satisfies enough of the features in the concept, it is fully fledged; there is 
no room for satisfying the concept to a greater degree’.xxvii 
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A second worry about the cluster model is that it treats sex in humans as the 
same as sex in other animal species. Certainly, the particular ranges of properties that 
are relevant to being a human female or a human male may well differ, in whole or 
part, from those relevant to being a female or male of another species: for instance, 
female birds have ZW rather than XX chromosomes, and male birds ZZ rather than 
XY. Nonetheless, on the cluster model sex in humans is the same kind of thing as sex 
in other species: namely, for humans and other animals, being sexed consists in 
having enough of one of the clusters of biological properties that are relevant to 
reproductive sex. On this view, there is nothing ontologically distinctive about sex in 
humans. 
Yet this view has difficulties from a feminist perspective. Because feminists 
have wanted to insist that gender norms can be changed or removed altogether, they 
have generally maintained that gender – and the social, cultural and historical 
dimension of human life of which gender is part – is irreducible to humanity’s natural 
or biological side. But if we also maintain that human sex difference is the same kind 
of reality as sex difference in non-human animals, then we seem to be picturing 
human beings as split between a uniquely socio-cultural side and a still animal, sexed 
side. Even if it is accepted in this picture that the two ‘sides’ interact, this interaction 
appears powerless to alter the mode of being of human sex, which seemingly remains 
the same as that of animal sex. 
Let me tentatively suggest that we could relieve the cluster model of these 
uncomfortable implications by combining it with elements of German Romantic and 
Idealist philosophies of nature. Arguably, the German Romantics and Idealists think 
that the cultural and historical domain that is unique to humanity is essentially 
characterised by normativity – that is, this domain is organised around epistemic, 
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ethical, aesthetic and other values which operate as norms guiding various human 
activities. On one line of interpretation, the German Romantics and Idealists take it 
that this norm-guidedness makes human cognitive, moral and cultural activities 
irreducible to the causal order of nature.xxviii But we need to complicate this 
interpretation, given that the German Romantics and Idealists think that nature itself 
contains a normative dimension. According to Hegel, all natural things develop 
rationally – that is, in accordance with norms of rationality – and so have a rational, 
conceptual side that is irreducible to their causal, material side. For the Early German 
Romantics, nature is a self-organising whole that develops, through self-
differentiation, into an infinite multiplicity of things and processes.xxix On this view, 
nature’s way of endlessly, creatively, unfolding parallels the process by which works 
of romantic literature unfold in an unfinished, fragmentary way, which reveals that 
nature as a whole, and the many component natural things, are developing according 
to aesthetic norms. 
On both these views – Hegel’s and that of the Early German Romantics – the 
norm-guided character of human cognitive, artistic and cultural activities is a further 
development and realisation of the norm-guidedness within nature. As such, humans 
are only able to develop a cultural side because they – in common with other animals 
– are organisms whose organisation is norm-guided (as part of nature’s overall norm-
guided self-organisation), a norm-guidedness that can be developed into further 
cultural forms. Even if our cultural activities affect and change our natural, organic 
side, then, they cannot alter its basic mode of being as natural and organic, for these 
cultural activities could not exist unless our organic nature persisted as the soil out of 
which they are constantly regenerated. Humans, qua cultural, must also be natural and 
organic. Moreover, for Hegel and the German Romantics, an essential part of the 
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character of higher organisms is that they reproduce sexually and are differentiated 
into two sexes with different roles in reproductionxxx (which need not imply that every 
single higher organism must be unambiguously sexed). On these grounds one might 
suggest, following Romantic and Idealist Naturphilosophie, that sex in humans must 
be the same kind of thing as sex in (other) animals because humans, although unique 
in respect of their cultural activities, can only be unique in this respect because they 
retain an organic, and sexed, nature in common with other higher animals. 
The French materialist feminists conceived their account of sex as materialist in 
that it treated gender as a socio-economic reality which is not merely independent of 
biology but, indeed, constructs sex out of non-sexed biology. I have argued that a 
more completely materialist feminism would recognise sex to be a biological reality, 
according to a cluster model of sex which allows that gender can be eradicated. But 
ironically, it may be that to defend this cluster model we need to combine it with 
German Idealist philosophies of nature – philosophies whose ‘idealism’ consists in 
their attribution to nature of not only materiality but also rational or aesthetic 
normativity (i.e. ‘ideality’). A fully materialist feminism may require an idealist 
approach to nature. 
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Press, 1985); Suzanne Kessler, Lessons from the Intersexed (New Brunswick, NJ.: 
Rutgers University Press, 1998); Georgia Warnke, ‘Intersexuality and the Categories 
of Sex’, in Hypatia 16: 3 (2001), pp. 126-37; as well as in the French materialist 
feminists discussed here. 
ii The publication of the anthology New French Feminisms, ed. Elaine Marks and 
Isabelle de Courtivron (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1980) was the 
founding moment in the emergence of this category. 
iii Moi, Introduction to French Feminist Thought, ed. Moi (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), 
p. 6. More recent anthologies of and books on ‘French feminism’ recognise the need 
to be more inclusive; e.g. Dani Cavallaro, French Feminist Theory: An Introduction 
(London: Continuum, 2003); Kelly Oliver, ed., French Feminism Reader (Lanham, 
Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000); Kelly Oliver and Lisa Walsh, eds., Contemporary 
French Feminism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
iv Delphy, Close to Home: A Materialist Analysis of Women’s Oppression, ed. and 
trans. Diana Leonard (London: Hutchinson, 1984), pp. 24-25. 
v Leonard and Adkins (‘Reconstructing French Feminism: Commodification, 
Materialism and Sex’, in Sex in Question: French Materialist Feminism, ed. Leonard 
and Adkins (London: Routledge, 1996, p. 16) argue that because the French 
materialists use terms (‘sex-class’, ‘social sex’) other than ‘gender’, they oppose the 
concept of gender. In contrast, I think that they use these terms as part of a 
programme of conceiving gender in a new, improved way – as something fully 
independent of sex and hence eradicable. Delphy is most explicit about this (Close to 
Home, pp. 25-27). However, I shall argue – with reference to Mathieu – that the same 
commitment to a reinterpreted concept of gender is effectively, if less explicitly, 
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present in the other French materialists too. 
vi Men’s economic exploitation of women in the family constitutes what Delphy calls 
the ‘domestic mode of production’, which is patriarchal in that it benefits men and 
which, Delphy claims, exists alongside and entwined with the capitalist mode of 
production. 
vii In later work Delphy argues directly for retaining the term ‘gender’ (genre): see 
‘Rethinking Sex and Gender’ (1993), in Sex in Question, p. 36. 
viii See Mathieu, ‘Sexual, Sexed and Sex-Class Identities [Identitée sexuelle/sexuée/de 
sexe]’ (1989) in Sex in Question, pp. 59, 68. 
ix Delphy concedes that some younger brothers and male agricultural workers are also 
exploited by male heads of household. (Her account of the domestic mode of 
production is based on her studies of French agricultural families.) 
x Sometimes the French materialists follow Simone de Beauvoir in holding that only 
women are seen as ‘the sex’, defined by their genitals as members of a class, whereas 
men are seen as sexually unmarked. But elsewhere the materialists claim that all 
individuals are seen as sexed because of the existence of a gender division. For 
instance, Guillaumin claims that, given gender, people’s reproductive organs are 
treated as the ‘sign’ or ‘mark’ of their (sex-)class membership (‘The Practice of 
Power and Belief in Nature’ (1978), in Sex in Question, p. 107). 
xi Close to Home, p. 24. 
xii Ibid., p. 159. 
xiii Ibid., pp. 212-13. 
xiv Ibid., p. 159. 
xv Ibid., pp. 212-13. According to Guillaumin, the idea of natural sex is just ‘the 
mental form taken by certain determined social relationships’ (‘Practice of Power’, p. 
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74). 
xvi However, suppose we ask Delphy why it is almost always those who have wombs, 
breasts, etc. who are exploited. Plausibly, this is because of the prevalence of certain 
beliefs about what tasks/social positions it is appropriate for people who have those 
bodily properties to do/occupy. That is, certain beliefs or ideas look like 
preconditions, not merely consequences, of the exploitative social relation. Delphy 
objects that granting ideas this much status is ‘idealism’, but arguably a viable 
feminist analysis just has to be more ‘idealistic’ than Delphy wishes. For unless we 
grant ideas and beliefs this preconditional status, then it looks as if it must be the 
sheer fact of possessing wombs, breasts, etc. which tends to render their possessors 
liable to exploitation. In short, we would have returned to the very biological 
determinism from which Delphy seeks to distance herself. 
xvii Timpanaro, On Materialism (1970), trans. Lawrence Garner (London: New Left 
Books, 1975), ch. 1. 
xviii Wittig, The Straight Mind and Other Essays (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992), pp. 
11-12. Wittig stresses that the domestic mode of production is not only patriarchal but 
also, equally fundamentally, heteronormative. This mode of production, under which 
women must work for their husbands, needs women to be tied into marital 
relationships and therefore requires women and men to be heterosexual, so that they 
will be motivated to contract heterosexual marriages. 
xix Ibid., p. 25. 
xx For this account see Richard Boyd, ‘How to Be a Moral Realist’, in Essays on 
Moral Realism, ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), 
pp. 96-99. 
xxi This account of the clusters of properties involved in sex might seem circular, since 
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it says that someone is male (or female) if they have enough of the ‘male’ (or 
‘female’) cluster of properties. But I am speaking of the ‘male’ (or ‘female’) cluster 
only as a shorthand for all the relevant properties – e.g. XY chromosomes, penis, 
prostate gland, etc. – so that listing all these properties would remove the circularity. 
However, I have also said that part of what makes these properties a cluster is that 
they enable those who have them to play the ‘male’ (or ‘female’) role in reproduction. 
Again, this circularity can be removed if we spell out all the elements of that role, e.g. 
production, storing and ejaculation of sperm, capacity for erection, etc. Let me stress, 
I am not claiming here that what it is to be female or male is to be able to play the 
relevant role in reproductive sex. (This would exclude those who are too old or young 
to reproduce or who are infertile, and would, problematically, imply that males and 
females ought to realise their natures by engaging in reproductive, heterosexual 
activity.) Rather, to be female or male is to have enough of the relevant cluster of 
properties, where part – but only part – of what makes these properties cluster is that, 
together, they generally support particular kinds of reproductive activity in people of 
suitable age (unless causes of infertility are present). So one could be female or male 
by having enough of these properties while not having enough, or the right 
combination of, properties to be able to contribute to reproduction. 
xxii I explain this cluster-based approach to sex more fully in my An Introduction to 
Feminist Philosophy (Cambridge: Polity Press, forthcoming 2007). 
xxiii To clarify: Wittig accepts that some individuals have breasts, vaginas, etc. while 
others have penises, testicles, etc., but she denies that these biological properties as 
such suffice to make those individuals sexed. Yet contrary to her intentions, Wittig’s 
own claims imply that individuals’ possession of those properties does make them 
biologically sexed. 
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xxiv ‘Rethinking Sex and Gender’, pp. 37-40. 
xxv Those with enough properties from both clusters to be both female and male are 
hermaphroditic (e.g. they might have one ovary and one testis, produce both egg and 
sperm cells and develop internal and external genitals which mix male and female 
attributes). 
xxvi Unless they also cross the threshold into the other sex, in which case they are 
hermaphroditic. 
xxvii Stoljar, ‘Essence, Identity, and the Concept of Woman’ in Philosophical Topics 
23: 2 (1995), p. 285. Stoljar contrasts this to the view that those who have crossed the 
threshold into femaleness/maleness (or into ‘womanness’, the subject of Stoljar’s 
interest) can be female/male to greater or lesser degrees. 
xxviii For example, Wayne Martin argues that for Fichte the fact that cognition is 
guided by a norm of representing outer reality makes cognition irreducible to the 
causal order of nature; see Martin, Idealism and Objectivity: Understanding Fichte’s 
Jena Project (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997), ch. 2. 
xxix See Frederick Beiser, The Romantic Imperative: The Concept of Early German 
Romanticism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003). Here I follow 
Beiser in assuming continuity between Early German Romanticism and the Idealism 
of the earlier Schelling and of Hegel. 
xxx See, for instance, Schelling, First Outline of a System of the Philosophy of Nature, 
trans. Keith R. Petersen (1799; Albany: SUNY Press, 2004), pp. 36, 40-42. 
